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Abstract. 
Although genetically modified (GM) organisms have attracted a great deal of public attention, 
analysis of their economic impacts has been less common. It is, perhaps, spatial externalities 
where the divergence between efficient and unregulated outcomes is potentially largest, 
because the presence of transgenic crops may eliminate or severely reduce the planting of 
organic varieties and other crops where some consumers have a preference for non GM crops. 
This paper constructs a simple model of the possible spatial external effects of the 
introduction of transgenic varieties and considers some of the public policy options for 
regulating the divergence between market outcomes and the efficient allocation of resources 
to GM crops. It is shown that co-existence may be impossible without strong regulation on 
planting patterns. 
 
Key words:  Genetically modified organisms; spatial externality; optimal regulation. 
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I. Introduction 
This paper focuses on some of the spatial effects of transgenic crops, when some consumers 
at least have a preference for non-modified crops. Because pollen and seed from transgenic 
varieties may spread from the original site of planting to neighbouring fields and farms, there 
is the potential for a spatial external effect – an example of what is sometimes termed ‘genetic 
pollution’. The major lessons of the paper are stark: first, even if a) many consumers are 
unwilling to buy genetically modified (GM) crops at any price and b) the degree to which GM 
crops affect non-modified variants is small, there may be no market equilibrium in which 
non-GM crops are grown. Secondly, market-based public policy instruments, such as a tax on 
GM varieties, may be only partially successful in achieving optimality - more dirigiste 
policies may be required to achieve efficiency. 
There is a growing literature analysing the economics of transgenic technologies (e.g. 
Batie, 2003, Fulton and Giannakas, 2004, Sianesi and Ulph, 1998, Goeschl and Swanson, 
2003, Munro, 2003, Nelson and  Bullock, 2003). This literature has largely ignored the issue 
of spatial externalities despite its salience in popular discussion of GM technology. 1  Belcher 
et al 2005, is a notable exception as it provides some interesting simulations of an agent-
based model that illustrate the potential for GM crops to eliminate non-GM varieties. This 
                                                 
1  There have been several high-profile legal cases (e.g. Guardian, 2000), in which 
biotechnology companies have sued farmers who claimed not to have bought or sown the 
transgenic seed, but whose crops have displayed evidence of the resistance to a specific 
herbicide which characterises the GM product. The farmers’ defence is that resistance is due 
to the spread of seed or cross-pollination from adjoining farms where the GM seed has been 
(legally) sown.  
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paper (see also Munro, 2000) goes beyond Belcher et al in a number of ways. First, I provide 
an analytical model in which consumers and producers optimize within what is clearly an 
economic environment. Second, the model is used to identify the circumstances when the 
external effect of the new varieties (i.e. transgenic) eliminates production of existing varieties. 
Thirdly, the model is used to consider the welfare costs of the unregulated transgenic 
technology. Finally, and perhaps most importantly I consider formally some of the public 
policy implications of the models for the prudential regulation of transgenic technologies.  
The plan of the paper is as follows: in the next section I give a brief overview of the 
evidence for spatial externalities in the context of GM crops. Section 3 provides a simple 
theoretical model which contrasts the social optimum outcome with the market equilibrium. 
Section four offers some illustrative simulations while in section five I consider the problem 
of optimal public policy instruments. Section six concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. Background.  
Much of the broad nature of transgenic technologies is now well-known (.e.g. Batie, 2003, 
Aslaksen and Myhr, 2007). For instance, with the Roundup Ready ™ varieties developed by 
Monsanto, genes which confer resistance to Roundup™   (Monsanto’s glyphosate herbicide) 
have been introduced into food crops. Compared to traditional varieties, the resulting plants 
have a higher tolerance for glyphosate which can therefore be used at higher than traditional 
doses to combat weed growth and also used at times in the growth cycle (such as after crop 
emergence) which would previously have been disastrous for yields.  
The spread of crops and their genes out of the planted field into the general 
environment occurs through a number of routes including airborne and insect-borne pollen 
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dispersal, as well as via seed loss during transit. As Rob Treu and Jean Emberlin, 2000, 
emphasise the degree to which the spread occurs depends on a variety of a factors, a number 
of which are specific to the crop and the locality in which it is grown. Meanwhile, the 
possibilities for the establishment of a feral population of the crop or for inter-breeding with 
wild relatives depends not only on the spread of pollen or seed, but also on the extent to 
which the crop is competitive in the wild, and on the genetic closeness and abundance of its 
relatives. As an example, oil seed rape (Brassica napus ssp. oleifera), has a number of close 
relatives growing wild, while other relatives are used as crops, including Brassica oleracea.  
(The wild plant is var. oleracea, cultivated varieties include cabbage, cauliflower, broccoli 
and Brussel sprouts.)  In contrast, wheat has few potential partners for hybridisation and its 
self-fertilising nature means that what little pollen is produced is viable only for short periods 
of time.  
The status of the debate on the issue of whether gene transfer represents an ecological 
or economic problem is exemplified by the lack of consensus on safe planting distances even 
at the official level. As an illustration, Table 1 shows the range of minimum planting 
distances between GM and non-GM varieties as recommended by member states in the 
European Union as of 2006. Even countries with access to shared scientific advice can 
therefore differ sharply on the issue. Meanwhile organic producers take a much stronger line: 
for instance the Soil Association, the principle certifier of organic produce in the UK, has set 
safe distances of 9600m (Soil Association, 1999) – higher than any of the figures in Table 1. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Beyond what might be termed the production externalities that would flow from the 
widespread transfer of resistance, there is, in addition, the issue of consumption externalities. 
Whatever the scientific facts about transgenic foods, reports of a price premium for non-GM 
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soybeans, coupled with widespread efforts to introduce labelling schemes, suggest that many 
consumers perceive GM and non-GM foods as different and that some consumers are willing 
to pay extra to have food which is certified free of GM ingredients. For instance, Noussair et 
al, 2004, report that amongst French consumers, 35% are unwilling to buy GM food, 23% are 
indifferent about its provenance and 42% would buy GM if the price advantage was sufficient. 
However, in the absence of an effective and economical means of separating GM and non-
GM varieties, fields infiltrated with a positive fraction of the GM variety will not reap the 
same price premium as crops guaranteed GM free. As a result, in a competitive market for 
foodstuffs, farms adjacent to farms where the GM variety is grown, producing the higher cost 
non-GM food, but compelled to sell it for the lower price of the GM variety are likely to face 
elimination from the market or be forced to switch to the GM variety.2 Potentially therefore 
co-existence of GM and non-GM varieties may not be possible within the same locality. It is 
this issue which is modelled in the next section. 
 
3. Modelling Spatial Externalities. 
To simplify the analysis we consider a rectangular-shaped spatial economy, the area of which 
represents the upper bound on the total amount of the crop which can be produced. I 
normalise the area of this rectangle to 1 and suppose its width to be w.  Two varieties of the 
crop can be produced, one of which is genetically modified, 'g', and which is not - 'n'. Let cg 
and cn be respectively, the unit cost of producing each type, with cg < cn. The corresponding 
prices are pg and pn and the quantities are qg and qn.  I suppose that each individual consumes 
                                                 
2  This issue may be particularly acute for the organic sector, given its position on safe 
distances. 
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only one variant, choosing between them on the basis of price and their ‘distaste’ for the 
genetically modified food. Specifically, let the indirect utility of the non-GM food be (a-pn)
2 
and let the indirect utility of the GM variant be  (a-θ-pg)2 where 0 <  θ <   a. Someone who 
does not care about the crop variant has a value of θ=0, while someone who would never 
consume the GM food has a value of θ=a. Normalise the marginal utility of income at 1, so 
that individual demand is either (a-pn) if the non-GM product is chosen or (a-θ-pg) if the 
consumer opts for the GM variety. Let the density function of consumers be f with F as the 
corresponding cumulative function. Finally, it will be useful to define Δp = pn-pg, as the price 
premium paid in the market place for the non-GM food.  
In the absence of any spatial externalities and with perfect competition and a free 
choice of variant for both producer and consumer, one of four outcomes will occur in 
equilibrium: 
Case 1. pg-cg = pn-cn > 0 and qg + qn = 1. 
Case 2. pg-cg = pn-cn = 0 and qg + qn < 1. 
Case 3. pg-cg > 0; pg-cg ≥ pn-cn and qg = 1. 
Case 4. pn-cn > 0; pn-cn ≥  pg-cg and qn = 1. 
In case 1 all the land is planted and there are positive quantities of both crops in equilibrium 
and positive profits for farmers. In case 2 some land is not planted, while in cases 3 and 4 the 
planting of a single crop is most profitable. Case 1 occurs when θm +1> cn -cg > θL-1, where 
θm is the mean value of θ and θL is the lowest value of θ for which f(θ)> 0. If there are some 
people who do not care about the source of the crop (i.e. θL = 0), then the right hand side of 
this inequality is automatically satisfied and case 4 cannot occur.  
Consider now the possibility of an external effect from the GM crop, in the sense that 
if the GM crop is grown at one site, all crops grown within a particular distance, d, from the 
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site are contaminated by GM varieties. I call this area the shadow of the GM crop. As a result, 
the consumer views all such crops as genetically modified and they therefore sell for pg. This 
is an extreme position in some ways, but it reflects the typical pattern of labelling regulations 
(in for instance Regulation (Ec) No 1830/2003 of the European Union) which are typically 
defined in terms of clear (but sometimes arbitrary) purity thresholds.  
As we shall see below, provided d is small compared to the total area under 
cultivation, it has only a marginal effect on the optimal planting of the two varieties, but it 
may still have a sharp impact on the market equilibrium.  
Let δ*(qn,qg) be the minimum possible affected land given the area devoted to each of 
the two crops and let δ be the actual affected area. Within a rectangle of width w, δ* is a fairly 
straightforward function of the variables qn and qg. If either variable is zero then δ* is zero as 
it will be if qn+qg < 1-wd (i.e. there is an area of unplanted land large enough to separate the 
two crops). If qn+qg=1, (i.e. case 1) then for sufficiently small values of one of these two 
variables the optimal pattern of cultivation is a quarter circle of the minority crop, centred on 
one of the corners of the rectangle. The majority crop then occupies the rest of the rectangle. 
For 1-w2/π > qg > w2/π the optimal pattern involves a single linear boundary between the two 
crops, across the width of the rectangle. For the purposes of simplifying exposition, I shall 
call this situation the central case in what follows and focus on it. I do not claim that 
necessarily this is empirically the most important case, but the range of parameter values 
brings to the fore the policy dilemmas in a fairly straightforward manner. 
In conventional fashion, the planner’s problem is to maximize the sum of consumer 
and producer surplus, W: 
W =  Consumer surplus for GM purchasers + Consumer surplus for non-GM 
purchasers + producer surplus for GM producers + producer surplus for non-GM 
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producers.  
Planner’s problems are often set in terms of quantities. To simplify understanding of the 
policy analysis which follows I use a mixture of prices (for consumers) and quantities (for 
producers) and suppose that the planner maximizes W subject to the constraints that supply 
be less than or equal to total land area, that demand equal the supply for each variant and that 
the shadow be no less than δ*. Thus the planner maximizes: 
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The first two terms in this expression represent the benefits of the two varieties, the 
third and fourth terms are the costs and  λ is the Lagrangean multiplier on the constraint that 
total production cannot exceed capacity. The next term represents the constraint that the area 
affected with GM cannot be smaller than δ*. Finally we have the two constraints that demand 
equals supply of the two types. Note the position of the ‘δ’ entries in these two constraints: 
total production of the GM variety is lower than the total consumption because crops from an 
area δ of the non-GM variety are viewed by consumers as GM crops. Conversely, production 
of the non-GM variety is greater than consumption, by the amount δ. 
Optimizing with respect to pn, pg, qn qg and δ, first order conditions for optimality are, 
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 021    (6) 
The subscripts on δ* represent the partial derivatives of that function. In addition there is the 
potentially relevant complementary slackness condition: 
 
n g
Either  1  =    +       or     =  0;q q   (7) 
Solving the equations (2)-(7) leads to the same 4 cases as above. In particular, in the central 
case as defined above, where δ*=wd, then δ*i = 0. As a result equations (2)-(3) are solved by 
setting pg = γg and pn = γ2. Using (4) and (5) we then get (γ1-γ2)=(cn-cg) so that at the optimum 
pn-cn= pg-cg ≥0.  
Note that in the central case the first order conditions are independent of d. It follows 
that the solution to the first order conditions is the same with and without the presence of the 
externality. The difference between the two worlds concerns the area affected by the 
externality which represents a fixed cost of having the GM variety. As a result for d>0 the 
maximand is not globally concave. There are therefore two cases to consider. If d is large 
enough a corner solution is optimal: it will be optimal to ban the GM variety and allow only 
the non-GM variety to be sold. Conversely if the area δ* (=dw) is small compared to the total 
area under cultivation, then the optimal consumption pattern will be identical to that which 
pertains in the absence of the external effect. That is, if (q*n,q
*
g) is the optimal mix of 
production in the absence of the external effect, then (q*n+dw,q
*
g-dw) will be optimal given 
the external effect, so that consumption is unchanged. 
We now need to consider the market equilibrium: an outcome such that, 
(a) given prices all consumers choose the type and quantity they prefer; 
(b) given prices and the planting decisions at every other coordinate in the rectangle, planting 
(GM, non-GM or not planting at all) at a given coordinate maximizes profits.  
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So, at each coordinate, a farmer chooses either not to plant, to plant the GM crop or to 
plant the non-GM crop. In fact no market equilibrium can occur that corresponds to the 
central case. We state this formally.   
Proposition. There can be no market equilibrium in which all land is cultivated and 
both types co-exist. 
Proof. Suppose that such an equilibrium exists. Since there is co-existence then pg -
cg= pn-cn. Since all land is cultivated there must be co-ordinates at which the non-GM 
crop is grown within a distance d of the GM crop.  For a crop grown at such a co-
ordinate the profit is pg-cn per unit since the crop sells at the GM price. But  cn > cg so 
pg-cn < pg -cg. Hence the decision to grow the non-GM crop at such a co-ordinate 
cannot be profit-maximizing.  
Note that this result is independent of the size of d, so that even if the externality is small (in 
the sense that d is small), the market equilibrium and the social optimum may be 
fundamentally different. 
More generally, the failure of co-existence of the crops when they must be grown 
adjacently means there are only three possible types of market equilibria: 
Case A.   No non-GM crops.  qn = 0. 
Case B.  No GM crops   qg = 0. 
Case C.  Not all land is cultivated. qg > 0; qn > 0. Between the GM and non-GM crops 
there is a distance of at least d which is uncultivated.  
These cases do not always coincide with cases 1-4 outlined earlier. For instance, the 
conditions under which Case 4 holds, for instance can lead to any of the 3 cases A-C. To 
clarify matters, Table 2 sets out a summary of the relationship between the optimal pattern of 
consumption and possible market equilibria. As can be seen, in some cases, multiple 
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equilibria are possible: it may be unprofitable for a producer to switch to GM production if all 
land is given over to non-GM, but at the same time if all land is used for GM, then entry by 
non-GM producers will be unprofitable.  
Table 2 here. 
In general, even if the profit margin on non-GM varieties far exceeds that on the GM 
variety, the GM crop can drive out the non-GM. The reason is quite simple: if a non-GM crop 
is grown within a distance d of the GM variety, the grower cannot capture the price premium 
attached to the non-GM variety however high that may be. In such a situation it is always 
more profitable to grow the GM crop, or possibly, to stop cultivation altogether.  
 
Model Robustness. 
These results are stark and negative in tone, so it is worth briefly considering their 
robustness (again concentrating on the central case). First, let us consider the cost advantage 
enjoyed by the GM producers. Suppose that some fraction, α, of the land could sustain a non-
GM crop grown at a unit cost lower than that for the GM crop. Since no consumer prefers the 
GM crop when it is available at the same price as its non-GM counterpart, the optimum 
always involves this entire fraction α being planted with the non-GM crop. However, on the 
remaining land the previous analysis applies. In other words, even if the optimum level of the 
non-GM crop exceeds α there is no market equilibrium in which more than α of the land is 
given over to the non-GM crop. Thus coexistence of the crops is possible, but the result is 
still generically inefficient.  
Consider also the role of the shadow, d. Suppose instead of being forced to charge pg 
< pn for the product grown in the shadow, the producer faces a discount that is proportional to 
the level of contamination. Given the simplistic nature of labelling laws this may seem 
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unrealistic. More to the point, as long as the price received, pn’ is less than that available for 
the non-GM crop, while the costs are the same, then no market equilibrium with all land 
planted and both crops can exist. If it did, then pg -cg= pn –cn, but then a producer growing the 
non-GM crop in the shadow could improve profits by switching to the GM variant. 
A third possibility is one of Coasean-style bargaining. Given that many market 
equilibria are inefficient there may be scope for bargaining between producers over what is 
grown on adjacent land. Clearly, if all producers can bargain collectively and costlessly, then 
an efficient outcome might result. Since a similar argument would apply to almost any 
problems of externalities, bargaining involving all producers is probably not a reasonable 
starting point, but there may be opportunities for bargaining between smaller sets of 
producers that can ameliorate the stark results of the proposition. Consider first a situation 
where a producer has one or two neighbours and the shadow of a GM crop covers exactly the 
neighbouring producer’s land.3 Focus on an inefficient market outcome where pg -cg< pn –cn 
and the case of a producer with a GM neighbour, both of whom take prices as given. In the 
absence of bargaining this producer will also plant the GM. However it may be able to 
negotiate a deal in which both it and the neighbour switch to non-GM.  If this neighbour also 
has a GM neighbour then the switch will raise joint profits of the negotiating producers (and 
produce the scope for a bilateral deal) when 
2(pg -cg) < pn –cn + pg –cn or 
(pg -cg) + ½(pn – pg) < pn –cn 
Recall that if co-existence is optimal then efficiency requires pg -cg= pn –cn. Thus 
                                                 
3 The easiest way to imagine this situation is to suppose for a moment that the available land 
is simply a linear strip, one farm wide and that all farms are of equal size.  
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costless bilateral bargaining can possibly eliminate some of the inefficiency of the extreme 
outcome where non-GM is excluded from the market, but does not in general lead to the fully 
efficient outcome.  
What happens if m>2 producers can engage in multilateral talks about simultaneously 
producing the non-GM crop? Provided only one of them has a GM neighbour outside the 
coalition, there are potential gains from bargaining amongst the m firms when: 
 (pg -cg) + (pn – pg)/m < pn –cn 
Thus, in the limit, as m→∞, the efficient outcome is achievable.4 
 In the context of the two dimensional model, where most producers have neighbours 
on all sides and the shadow of a GM crop is the set of neighbours (as in Figure 1), the 
argument becomes more complicated, essentially because if one group of m2 adjacent firms 
switch to non-GM the shadow is linear in m. Formally, if a square of m2 adjacent producers 
(m ≥ 3), surrounded by GM contemplate a switch from GM to non-GM then their joint profits 
will rise when, 
   (pg -cg) + 4(m-1)(pn – pg)/m2 < pn –cn 
Again, therefore one can conclude that as m→∞, the efficient outcome is achievable or 
conversely, the level of feasible multilateral bargaining sets a limit on the achievable level of 
efficiency. One can also conclude that in this particular example at least 9 producers must be 
involved for any joint gains to be achievable from bargaining. Further, though the minimum 
number of bargaining firms may be as small as 4, (if the producers are located in the corner of 
the production rectangle), simple bilateral bargaining can never produce gains to both parties 
                                                 
4 As m becomes large it becomes less reasonable to take prices as given and unaffected by the 
decision of the coalition.  
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in a context where all producers are initially GM.5 
 To sum up, the proposition is robust in the face of bargaining behaviour, provided that 
only bilateral bargaining is possible and if the shadow of a GM producer encompasses all the 
land of its neighbours. If it is feasible to have larger coalitions of producers then the extreme 
outcome described in the proposition may be modified: that is equilibria can exist with both 
GM and non-GM crops, but in general unless the maximum feasible bargaining coalition is 
large, the efficient outcome is not achievable.  
 
4. Some Simulations. 
The model of the previous section is essentially static. In addition, its simplicity hides the 
starkness of the main result that the market equilibrium may be radically different from the 
optimum even if the external effect is small. To illustrate the point that different patterns of 
planting can have strongly differing implications for external effects, this section provides 
some illustrative calculations of the impact of the introduction of transgenic crops in a highly 
stylised agricultural district, composed of equal-sized fields occupying a square territory of 
width and length n. There are therefore n2 fields, each of which can be planted with either a 
                                                 
5 This discussion has proceeded on the basis of a right to plant anything. If instead producers 
have a right to sell non-GM then it is worth thinking of the all non-GM outcome as the status 
quo and considering the gains from a firm switching to GM. The basic points of the story are 
then similar: 1) the bigger the feasible coalition of bargaining firms, the greater the gains in 
efficiency; 2) bilateral bargaining cannot produce gains because a single would-be producer 
of GM must negotiate with 8 neighbours (3 if it is in a corner) to purchase the right to plant 
GM. 
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transgenic or non-transgenic variety. For any given total number of fields given over to the 
transgenic variety, I consider three patterns of planting. In the first case, 'externality 
minimizing', the allocation of the transgenic variety to fields is done so as to minimize the 
number of adjacent non-transgenically planted fields. In the second case, 'externality 
maximizing' the number of adjacent fields of non-transgenic crops is maximized. In the third 
case, 'random' the fields given over to the transgenic crop are chosen at random, with each 
field having an equal probability of being chosen. The second variant of the model - 
maximizing the externality - may be seen as highly artificial, but it provides a useful 
benchmark. The first variant is the pattern which would be chosen by a social planner - it is 
optimal, given the number of fields dedicated to the transgenic crop. The third variety can be 
seen as the outcome when each farmer acts independently.  
True patterns of planting will typically fall somewhere between the first and third 
variants. The planting of varieties is often geographically concentrated because of underlying 
correlations of soil types and local weather conditions between farms. In addition, informal 
and formal information transmission mechanisms between farmers, plus variations in the 
dominant local supplier of farming inputs, and in the sites of food processors, all lead to 
clusters in patterns of planting. Against this, risk management practices by farmers and 
individual preferences tend to lower local concentration. As a result the random model may 
be a useful first approximation to actual patterns of land use. 
I proceed as follows. For n=20 I calculate the pattern of GM planting which 
minimizes and maximizes the externality effect, assuming that the external effect is confined 
to the adjacent fields. Thus for 1 transgenically-planted field in the centre of the square, 
another eight fields are affected. In fact for n=20, with only 49 fields planted transgenically 
all other fields can be adjacent to a transgenically-planted field. For the random planting, I 
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draw sequences of 50 random numbers from the set {1,…,400}. Each number then represents 
a field given over to the transgenic crops. The number of adjacent fields affected is then 
calculated. 
Figure 1 shows some illustrative patterns of the spatial externality (for n=9 rather than 
the value of n used in the actual simulations). In the figure, black-shaded squares represent 
fields planted with transgenic crops. The diagonally-shaded squares then represent the fields 
in the shadow of the transgenically-planted fields. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
As an alternative method, some approximate theoretical calculations can be used to 
predict the effect of random planting. Suppose that (t-1) randomly selected fields have been 
denoted transgenic and that as a result, a proportion π of the total area is affected by the 
transgenically-planted fields (π includes those fields actually planted with the transgenic 
varieties plus their shadow). Then the probability that the next randomly selected field (the tth) 
lies in the shadow is approximately π and the probability it lies outside of the shadow is 
approximately (1-π). If it does lie in the shadow then no new fields are added to the shadow. 
On the other hand if the tth field lies outside of the shadow, then for n=20, the expected 
number of fields in the shadow plus the field itself is 8.41.6 It follows that an approximate 
differential equation governing π is, 
                                                 
6 Note that this number allows for the fact that transgenic fields near the corners or one edge 
of the territory have a smaller shadow than fields away from the edges. Formally in a nxn area, 
there are (n-1)x(n-1) fields with a shadow of 9. The remaining (2n-1) fields that line the 
perimeter each have a shadow of 3. Thus the expected shadow of a randomly selected field is 
9-6(2n-1)/n2 
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 8.41(1 ) / 400
d
dt

   (8) 
Solving this equation yields the formula: 
 
8.41
4001
t
e

   (9) 
Of course this formula is approximate. In practice the tth field may not lie in the 
shadow of an existing transgenic field, but it may lie adjacent to the shadow in which case the 
number of new fields added to the shadow will be smaller than that predicted by the theory. 
Additionally, the formula becomes nonsensical for large values of t, because with t=400 all 
fields must be transgenically planted. However, for low levels of GM planting it works well, 
as figure 2 illustrates. There, in addition to curves depicting the consequences of the 
externality maximizing and minimizing patterns of planting, figure 2 plots two curves, one of 
which is the mean from the randomly generated sets of transgenically-planted fields ('mean') 
and one of which is equation (9) ('theory'). In fact this equation explains over 99% of the 
variation in the data generated by the random numbers method. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
The results in figure 2 suggest that if transgenic crops occupy only 10% of the area, 
then over 60% of the total area could be denied to non-transgenic crops though the spatial 
externality is only one field in extent.7 Although the details should perhaps not be taken too 
                                                 
7 Further simulations were carried out with larger potential shadows and larger values of n. 
Typically, with a shadow extending to two field widths, less than 10% of the area was 
available to non-GM crops when only 10% of the area was randomly planted with transgenic 
varieties. With three field widths only a fraction of the territory remained outside of the 
shadow. 
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seriously, figure 2 does illustrate some important principles. First, the area potentially 
affected in two dimensions is proportional to the square of the area planted and is therefore 
not linear. Second, most crucially for policy purposes, the different patterns of planting can 
have widely differing patterns of impact. The area unavailable for non-GM varieties with 
random planting is up to 3.7 times the area unavailable under the externality minimizing 
solution. 
Some work on the dynamics of planting was also carried out. I use a baseline model in 
which the GM crops have a cost advantage of 10%, three percent of the population are 
indifferent between GM and non-GM (θ=0), 65% would refuse to take the GM at any positive 
price (θ=a), and the remainder have values of θ uniformly distributed on (0,a). This particular 
configuration of parameters yields an initial market share of 5% for the GM variety in the first 
period. About one third of all the land area is then unavailable for the non-GM crop. 
Consequently, in the next period the profitability of the GM crop falls to zero. Assume that 
the fields newly planted with the GM variety in the second period are adjacent to those used 
for the GM crops in the first period. An equilibrium is reached in which approximately 6% of 
the land is used for GM, 61% is used for the non-GM crop and a further 33% in the shadow 
of the GM crop remains uncultivated. Changes to the parameters around the initial values (e.g. 
using consumer preference figures  similar to the results of Noussair et al, 2004 or Matsumoto, 
2006 for consumers in Japan), yield very similar results, principally because the shadow of 
the planted area is so large compared to the area of transgenic crops. Also because prior to the 
introduction of the GM crop all land is used for non-GM production, these results represent a 
relatively high cost from the launch of the GM variety (approximately 19% of the total initial 
surplus) so it is worthwhile stressing the assumptions made of random planting and the 
absence of natural or man-made barriers in the landscape. Both of these factors would 
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potentially limit the spatial externality.8 
 
 
5. Policy Options. 
In discussing the robustness of the proposition we have already seen the possibilities of 
Coasean bargaining and also the limitations. In this section, I consider other possible 
interventions in the market equilibrium, designed to maximize the total surplus which in turn 
implies efficiency in consumption and efficiency in production. The latter means minimizing 
the total costs of producing aggregate consumption levels (q*n,q
*
g). Given a GM-affected area 
of δ, this implies total costs = cn(q*n+ δ)+cg(q*g-δ). So minimizing production costs given the 
aggregate consumption level also means minimizing δ and thus it follows that  production 
efficiency is also externality minimizing.  The main conclusion from this section is that 
achieving consumption efficiency is relatively straightforward, but that production efficiency 
is more problematic.  
To create consumption efficiency there has to be some incentive for farmers to sow 
the non-GM crop when they lie in the shadow of GM crops. In this way the crops can co-exist 
in a market equilibrium. For a non-GM farmer, the effect of being in a region affected by GM 
crops is to lower the price received per unit from pn to pg. Hence one Pigouvian instrument is 
                                                 
8  The results on the rapid spread of the GM contaminated land deviate somewhat from 
Belcher et al, 2005. The big differences are that I incorporate consumer demand (that slows 
the spread) and allow the possibility of unused land. These two elements help promote co-
existence.  
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a per unit subsidy, s, on the non-GM crop of s = Δp9.  
In this context, consider a market equilibrium in which aggregate consumption is 
(q*n,q
*
g) – i.e. at its optimum levels. From equations (2)-(7) we know that equilibrium 
consumer prices are such that pg-cg = pn-cn ≥0. Thus farmers growing the non-GM crop and 
selling it as such receive profits per unit of Δp +pn-cn . Hence they have no incentive to switch 
crops. Any farmer growing GM crops and completely surrounded by non-GM farms would 
have an incentive to switch crops, so this particular pattern cannot be part of an equilibrium. 
However, any producer growing GM and lying within the shadow of another GM producer 
would receive pg-cn+ Δp = pn-cn = pg-cg from switching and therefore has no incentive to do 
so. Finally, for a non-GM producer in a GM-affected area the per unit profits from planting 
non-GM are pg-cn+pn-pg = pn-cn, compared to pg-cg obtainable from planting the GM crop. 
Hence again there is no incentive to switch. So, there exists a market equilibrium in which pn-
cn= pg-cg, aggregate consumption levels of the two products are (q
*
n,q
*
g), all land is 
cultivated.10 Moreover, on the consumption side this equilibrium is unique. 
To see this suppose not and consider first the case of some other prices p’n, p’g which 
do not satisfy p’n-cn= p’g-cg. If p’n-cn > p’g-cg, then a GM farmer can make more profit by 
                                                 
9 Although I analyse a subsidy for the non-GM crop the lessons of this section apply 
equally to a unit tax of Δp on GM crops. A subsidy of Δp on non-GM crops is largely wasted 
in the sense that in the market equilibrium, most of the subsidy is paid to intra-marginal 
farmers. Hence a cheaper and equally effective instrument is a subsidy paid only to farmers 
planting in the shadow of GM crops.  
10 And no GM producer is isolated, in the sense of being outside the shadow of any other GM 
producer. 
  -22- 
switching to producing the non-GM crop. Hence p’n-cn > p’g-cg cannot be a market 
equilibrium. If p’n-cn < p’g-cg, then a non-GM farmer can make more profit by switching to 
the GM crop. So in any equilibrium the prices must satisfy p’n-cn= p’g-cg. If these other prices 
were higher, then total demand would be lower and so some land would be uncultivated, but 
then given the profitability of production, some farmer would wish to produce on the 
uncultivated land. So, suppose the other prices were lower, then there would be excess 
demand for one or both products - implying that feature (a) of a market equilibrium was not 
satisfied.  
As intimated above, the issue of production efficiency is more problematic. Although 
a subsidy of Δp on the non-GM crop yields an outcome which is unique for consumption, 
there is typically a non-unique solution to the planting decision. Figure 3 illustrates the 
problem. In this diagram, shaded cells represent the non-GM crop, cells with diagonal stripes 
represent the non-GM crop which is viewed by consumers as GM because it is planted in the 
shadow of the GM crop and unshaded cells represent the GM crop. As can be seen, in both 
parts of the figure the total production of the non-GM crop that is sold to consumers as non-
GM is the same. Likewise the total area sold as GM is the same. However, the configuration 
of crops in 3a is production efficient because it minimizes the area of crops sown as non-GM 
and sold as GM. If s = Δp then both configurations represent a market equilibrium. It is 
readily seen therefore, that using a per-unit subsidy is compatible with a pattern of planting 
which is highly inefficient, in the sense of maximizing the area of non-GM affected by GM 
crops given the constraint that aggregate consumption equal (q*n,q
*
g). The same holds true for 
any instrument that does not give incentives for crop types to cluster.11 
                                                 
11  We have already had a discussion of the difficulty of bilateral bargaining to achieve 
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[Figure 3 about here] 
One instrument that does produce clustering incentives is a per unit subsidy on the 
non-GM crop equal to Δp[δ/δ*(qn,qg)] . Since δ = δ* at the social optimum, then the social 
optimum is a market equilibrium. Moreover it is the only market equilibrium consistent with 
consumption efficiency.12 However, there will typically be other market equilibria which are 
neither production efficient nor consumption efficient. To see this, note that the market 
equilibrium condition for producers is Δpδ/δ* = cn-cg. If this holds then no GM producer can 
gain from switching to non-GM production and no non-GM producer can gain from 
switching to GM production. However, consider any production efficient pattern of planting 
such Δp < cn-cg (so that the consumption of non-GM crop exceeds its optimum value). Now, 
into the GM zones imagine introducing isolated patches of the non-GM crop so that all the 
patches of non-GM lie in the shadow of GM crop. As a result the consumer prices of GM and 
non-GM are unchanged, but δ exceeds δ*. Continue with this procedure until Δpδ/δ* = cn-cg 
and we have a market equilibrium, but one which is consumption inefficient.  
These alternative market equilibria are not all stable, in the sense that for some small 
changes in land-use, there can be no incentive for decentralised planting decisions to reinstall 
the original equilibrium. To see this, consider a switch of production of some infinitesimal 
unit of land from GM crops to non-GM. Three cases are possible. First the unit of land may 
                                                                                                                                                        
efficiency, but it is also worth noting that the problem represented by Figure 3b is not solved 
by allowing bilateral bargaining.  
12 It does though suffer from some clear disadvantages in that, unlike the simpler instrument 
discussed previously, the value of the subsidy requires calculations of δ which in turn may 
require extensive information on planting patterns. 
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be added to the shadow, in which case δ would rise. Meanwhile the total quantity of each type 
of crop reaching consumers would be unchanged, so consumer prices would be unchanged. 
This would lower the profitability of GM relative to non-GM grown in the shadow, 
encouraging more farms to switch from GM to non-GM. 
In the second case, suppose the unit of land lies outside the shadow of other GM 
farms, so that its produce can be sold as non-GM. Since this yields greater profits than GM at 
the market equilibrium, then the alternative market equilibria are not stable in the face of 
perturbations of this kind. Finally, the conversion could release some other plot of land from 
the shadow, but be in the shadow itself. The net effect would be that the quantity of non-GM 
crop reaching consumers would rise. As a result, GM crops would become relatively more 
profitable compared to non-GM crops grown in the shadow encouraging the unit of land to be 
converted back to GM. Thus unlike the first two cases, in the face of this kind of perturbation 
the equilibrium is stable. 
  It is also true that the market equilibrium where s=Δp[δ/δ*(qn,qg)] and δ=δ*(qn,qg) is 
also not stable in the face of some perturbations: if a unit of land used for growing GM crops 
is switched to non-GM at the social optimum then δ rises, raising an incentive for other GM 
farms to switch varieties. 
Summing up, market-based instruments are relatively easy to implement if the goal is 
purely one of consumption efficiency, but the equilibria may be non-unique and not stable. As 
a result, assuring production efficiency is problematic. So, finally, let us briefly investigate 
policies which mix market-based incentives with planting regulations. 
Obviously one way to achieve optimality is to specify the land which is to be devoted 
to each crop. This encounters the familiar Hayekian issue that that planner must know 
consumer preferences if the optimal allocation of land is to be made, but typically preferences 
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are not known with this precision. A relatively straightforward way to overcome the problem 
is to mix a unit subsidy with a licensing scheme for crops. Any grower may apply for a 
license to grow GM crops. Such a license will only be approved however, when the resulting 
pattern of land use is externality-minimizing. If the subsidy for non-GM crops is set at Δp 
then demand for the license will be up to the point at which Δp=cn-cg. In this way both 
consumption and production efficiency may be achievable. 
  
6. Discussion. 
 This paper has examined the problem of spatial contamination by transgenic crops. Its 
essential lesson is that efficiency is unlikely to obtain without regulation and that in some 
circumstances co-existence between GM and non-GM varieties may be unsustainable in an 
unregulated market. As a result policy interventions were considered. The necessity of these 
policy instruments obviously rests on the assumption of an external effect flowing from the 
introduction of transgenic crops, but it also rests on the uninterrupted spread of the externality. 
To the extent that natural physical barriers, intervening crops, cities, etc. separate groups of 
farms growing the same crop into isolated islands of production, it is possible that a rough 
approximation to optimality can be achieved without extensive regulation. However, note that 
as long as there is no cost to the GM-planting farmer from introducing a transgenic crop into 
a previously GM-free geographical area, then equilibrium between GM and non-GM cultivars 
is inherently unstable. 
The feasibility of the instruments depends in part on the size of the barrier which must 
be maintained in order to avoid cross-contamination between transgenic and non-transgenic 
cultivars.  Although physical barriers such as hedges and woodland can reduce the flow of 
dispersing pollen, the conclusion of the Treu and Emberlin survey was that such features 
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diluted rather than contained the flow. Meanwhile safe distances are potentially large, to go 
by the UK Soil Association's decision to define a circle of  radius 6 miles (9.6 km) from a 
planted crop to the nearest field of its transgenic relative, within which it would reserve the 
right to label a crop 'non-organic'.  For non-organic, non-transgenic crops, the requirements 
will ultimately be determined by consumer preferences and may not be so large. National 
regulators (see Table 1) have set much smaller distances,  but even they are of the order of a 
field-width, which as we have seen above can imply large areas affected by GM crops.  
A final important issue which is not captured in the model is the important issue of 
irreversibility. For transgenic oilseed rape, Norris et al, 1999, found viable seed in the soil 
persisted for up to 3 years after the initial planting of the crop. In its list of qualifying 
regulations for organic crops, the UK’s Soil Association will not accept crops grown on land 
where transgenic crops have been grown within the last five years. Irreversibility does not 
alter the equilibrium analysis presented in section 2. However it affects the feasibility of 
certain paths to equilibrium. In particular, it may be problematic to approach the social 
optimum from a situation where the GM crop is grown beyond its optimal extent or where its 
planting has been poorly co-ordinated. 
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Table 1. The Range of Officially Recommended minimum separation distances for GM 
Crops in the European Union 
Crop Maximum (metres) Minimum (metres) 
Maize 800m  (Luxembourg) 25m (Netherlands) 
Maize (organic crop) 800m (Hungary) 50m (Spain) 
Maize (certified seed crop) 800m (Hungary) 200m (Denmark) 
Potato (organic) 20m (Denmark) 2m (Sweden) 
Beet (organic) 2000m (Portugal) 3m (Netherlands) 
Source(s): Table 3, Commission of the European Communities, 2006. Note that as of 2007 
not all EU member states have settled on official minimum distances.  
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Table 2. Optimality and Possible Market Equilibria. 
Market 
Equilibrium→ 
Social optimality↓ 
Case A 
qn=0 
Case B 
qg=0 
Case C 
qn+qg ≤ 1-wd;  
qn>0; qg>0 
Case 1.  
qn+qg=1; qn>0; qg>0 
If qg** ≥ 1-wd or if 
shadow covers all 
land. 
 
Not Possible 
If  qg** < 1-wd 
Case 2  
qn+qg≤1; qn>0; qg>0 
If shadow covers all 
land 
 
Not Possible 
If  qg** < 1-wd 
Case 3  
qg=1 
 
Possible  
 
Not possible 
 
Not Possible 
Case 4  
qn=1 
 
If θL≤a-cg 
 
Possible 
 
If  qg** < 1-wd 
Notes: 
1. ‘Possible’ means that the market equilibrium is a possible outcome given the conditions 
under which Case i, i=1,…,4 pertains without further restrictions on the parameters.  
2. qg** = demand for GM crop when pn=a and pg= cg. That is the maximum demand for the 
GM crop possibly compatible with a market equilibrium. 
3. If θL≤a-cg is satisfied then production of the GM crop is profitable in the absence of the 
non-GM product. 
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Figure 1. Illustrative Patterns 
of the GM Spatial Externality. 
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Figure 2.  The relationship between area planted with GM variety and the 
area unavailable to non-GM varieties. 
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Figure 3a. One boundary, production 
efficiency. 
Figure 3b. Two boundaries, production 
inefficiency. 
 
Note: Shaded area = non-GM crop sold as non-GM. Diagonally shaded = non-GM crop sold as 
GM. Unshaded area = GM crop. 
 
 
 
 
